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centered “vertical” health program advocated by the United States and the centralized healthcare structure of the
Soviet Union. The World Health Organization (WHO) embraced it as a model of Primary Healthcare, adopted to
achieve a goal of “health for all” by the World Health Assembly in 1977, and formally included in the Declaration of
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CHAPTER 6
From China’s “Barefoot Doctor” to Alma
Ata: The Primary Health Care AQ1Movement
in the Long 1970s
Zhou Xun
A LONG JOURNEY ALWAYS BEGINS WITH A SINGLE STEP: THE
BACKGROUND OF THE FIRST US MEDICAL DELEGATION TO THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1971
In the Chinese calendar 1971 was the Year of Pig, a symbol of the Chinese AQ2
Zodiac that denotes steady prosperity. The United Nations (UN) 26th
General Assembly designated 1971 as the Year of China. According to
Richard Hottelet, the UN correspondent for CBS News, “Peking’s
approach to the UN suggests that it now prefers to enter the game of
international politics.”1 At that time more than a dozen countries had
recently established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). Even the United States, formerly the PRC’s greatest
enemy, supported it taking a seat at the UN. In 1971, too, at the invitation
of the China Medical Association (CMA), the first medical delegation
from the United States visited the PRC. For 24 years there had been a
complete absence of contact between Chinese and American health
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professionals, meaning this trip was often termed the “historical visit.” It
was indeed historical, not least because it was far from being simply a
medical enterprise. ‘Medicine’ and ‘humanitarianism’ had both played
pivotal roles in the political and diplomatic negotiations within the
White House that eventually led to the opening to China.
The visit had been initiated by Edgar Snow, the American journalist
and author of Red Star over China, who was, according to John Stewart
Service, at that time the “chief contact” between the United States and
mainland China.2 At the invitation of the Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee, acting on behalf of Chairman Mao Zedong, in June
1970 Snow visited China. The invitation came in response to an earlier
request by Snow to be allowed to observe the Chinese Cultural
Revolution, since confusing reports of this event had disturbed him. He
became the first Western journalist to visit China since 1966 and report on
the Cultural Revolution. On his return to the West, Snow published
numerous articles on his trip and his interviews with Chinese leaders in
both Life Magazine and its popular Italian counterpart Epoca, in which he
stated that China was willing to welcome US President Richard M. Nixon.
One of his articles for Epoca also featured the PRC’s achievements in
medicine and public health, citing examples that included Chinese suc-
cesses in limb reimplantation and acupuncture anesthesia, together with
various public health initiatives, especially its birth control efforts and the
Barefoot Doctor program.3
Snow’s accounts of the PRC’s achievements in public health and med-
icine aroused much interest in the West, but also provoked criticism from
some quarters. Snow’s attackers claimed he was not a qualified observer,
since he lacked any medical training. In response, Snow asked his friend
E. Grey Dimond, a cardiologist, medical educator, and innovator who had
founded the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Medicine, to
visit China and report back on his professional observations.4 Dimond
agreed to do so but he urged Snow to extend a further invitation to his
mentor, Paul Dudley White, a distinguished cardiologist who had been
President Eisenhower’s personal physician. Professionally, Dimond
argued, White’s inclusion would enhance their medical credibility. Other
historical evidence, however, reveals that White’s contribution went
beyond being an authoritative medical voice, and that he played a crucial
role in US foreign policy.
A few years before this episode, in July 1962, Huang Jiasi, a renowned
cardiologist who was president of the Chinese Academy of Medical
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Science, had invited White to visit China the following spring, after the
two men had met at an international cancer congress in Moscow. At the
last moment, however, the Chinese host withdrew the invitation, on the
grounds that the United States had “persistently adopted a reactionary
policy against New China, and blockaded every possible channel of com-
munication between the peoples of our two countries.”5 At this juncture,
White approached the lawyer Grenville Clark, his patient and personal
AQ4
friend, for legal advice on the subject. Although Clark—whose daughter
was married to Dimond—had no professional interest in building medical
connections between the two countries, he perceived this as an opportu-
nity to break down the estrangement and alienation separating both the
peoples and governments of China and the United States. More impor-
tantly, Clark also saw this as the first step on his long personal journey
toward achieving international peace, and believed that the PRC could
play an integral role in implementing proposals for global disarmament
that he supported. Initially, Clark had hoped that the Soviet Union would
persuade the PRC to agree to this, but as the growing Sino-Soviet split
became more apparent after 1962, he had lost faith in this outcome.
Meanwhile, Clark had become increasingly disenchanted with official
American hostility toward China. According to William Worthy, the civil
rights activist and journalist, Clark was also eager to visit the PRC himself.6
When White sought his help, Clark immediately took on the case and
sought Edgar Snow’s advice. The two men embarked on a long, friendly
correspondence on the subject. Snow wrote many letters to Chinese
leaders, while Clark and White negotiated with Averell Harriman, at that
time under-secretary of state for political affairs and subsequently ambas-
sador-at-large during the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson.
In one letter to Johnson, dated August 10, 1965, and probably drafted by
Clark, White offered to help “to break our deadlock with China.”7 In a
further letter on August 16, White went so far as to pledge: “If at any time,
you think that you may be able to use me in any mission, no matter how
difficult or hazardous, please don’t fail to call on me.” After reading this,
Johnson expressed deep interest and decided to involve McGeorge Bundy,
his special assistant for National Security Affairs.8
Although Bundy felt that any official backing for White’s visit to China
would be disadvantageous to the United States, since “the Red Chinese
would turn it down,” he nonetheless kept an open mind. At a time when
he believed US policy in Vietnam was reaching “a new level of clarity and
firmness,” he thought White’s appeal might have come at an apposite
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moment. Bundy summoned James Thomson, the White House’s China
expert, to his office and handed him White’s letter, telling him: “Take it
and run with it. Here is your chance.” Thomson thereupon drafted a
memorandum for the president. Following Thomson’s recommendation,
Bundy proposed to “ease our present travel restrictions and make a general
rule that doctors and public health specialists—or perhaps all workers in
the fields of health, education, and welfare—would be authorized to
receive visas.” White’s ostensibly “professional” trip to China was put on
the agenda for discussion at a meeting of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.9 That meeting agreed to a
clear, but unofficial presidential authorization for the issue of unrestricted
passports to doctors, scientists, and individuals in public health and related
fields. Their activities, the White House explained, could be viewed as
neither political nor threatening. In terms of positive public relations,
endorsing such professional exchanges between China and the United
States as White’s trip to China as a physician was desirable, since these
visits could be perceived as designed to “increase the understanding
essential for the promotion of human welfare.”10 Officials also believed
that the health and welfare dimension, and especially the participation of
White, who was known to be on the center-right of American politics,
could help to deflect right-wing criticism.
For the next few months “health” became a useful term that featured
regularly in White House discussions of China and its foreign policy. At
the first White House Conference on Health in November 1965, for
example, Secretary of State Dean Rusk openly declared that “health is a
matter which cuts across national frontiers, cuts across ideologies, cuts
across political controversies. [ . . . ] For example, if an American doctor
receives an invitation to visit a place to which we do not ordinarily
encourage Americans to travel, I can assure you I would do my very
best to see that he gets a passport to accept such an invitation. Because
these are not problems which ought to be governed by political process
but ought to be governed by the elementary interest of man in his
health.” At the end of his address, Rusk described the export of
American health capability as one of the strongest aspects of US foreign
policy.11 For health professionals, Rusk’s speech marked a new era for
health and medicine in America. There was a strong sense that the
government and health professionals could work collaboratively to
meet growing global demands and address domestic and international
social change.
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A few days later, at Thomson’s request, White wrote formally to Rusk,
asking if he would put his Health Conference speech into practice by
issuing unrestricted passports for all travelers in the field of medicine and
public health. A month later, on December 29, 1965, after several man-
euvers back and forth, the White House formally announced the revised
regulations, highlighting White’s pivotal role in these.12 In this sense, one
might argue that the negotiations over White’s China trip represented the
first step in the long journey of the 1970s toward US–PRC rapproche-
ment. Thanks to the Chinese Cultural Revolution and escalating US
involvement in the Vietnam War, White nonetheless had to wait until
1971 before his China trip finally became reality. While the request to
include him undoubtedly came through Dimond, it was politically vital
that this first US medical delegation to Communist China should include
White.
On September 18, 1971, four months after the US ping-pong team set
foot in the Chinese capital, the first US medical delegation arrived in
Beijing. In addition to White and Dimond, the delegation included
White’s wife, Ina, and Dimond’s wife, Mary; Samuel Rosen, an interna-
tionally acclaimed ear surgeon from New York, and his wife; and Victor
and Ruth Sidel. Although none of the group had previously visited China,
Rosen and the Sidels had, like White, long wished to do so. According to
the State Department, in August 1961 Communist China had sent Rosen
an invitation through the PRC Consulate General in Geneva, asking him
to visit China to demonstrate his unique surgical technique to relieve a
common form of deafness. Rusk initially refused to permit this trip, but
after years of negotiations between Wang Bingnan and Jacob Beam, the
Chinese and US ambassadors to Poland, the State Department eventually
agreed that Rosen and his wife could go to China “for humanitarian
purposes.” When announcing this, the State Department nonetheless
denied that the United States had any interest in normalizing its relation-
ship with Communist China, thereby angering the Chinese. On
December 21, a week before Rosen’s scheduled China trip, the CMA—
Rosen’s Chinese host—claimed that the US government’s “policy of
hostility towards China” was “besmirching science and friendship” and
therefore asked him “for the time being” to cancel his visit.13
Victor Sidel, who grew up in an Eastern European Jewish immigrant
family in New York City, was well known for his work in social justice,
public health, and international health. A strong opponent of the US
government’s use of chemical weapons in Vietnam, Sidel worked closely
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with Arthur Galston, a biologist at Yale University, who was in Vietnam
when the American ping-pong team visited China, an event that inspired
Galston to go to the Chinese Consulate in Hanoi to ask for a Chinese visa.
His request was granted. After Galston returned to the United States from
China, Sidel, by then filling a new chair of Social Medicine at Montefiore
Medical Center and a professor of Social Medicine at the Albert Einstein
College of Medicine, approached Galston to secure Chinese visas for
himself and his wife, Ruth. Galston promptly wrote to Guo Moruo, the
director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), whom he had met
while in Beijing. The invitation came quickly, with the Sidels successfully
granted Chinese visas from the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa.14
THE “CHINESE APPROACH” TO HEALTHCARE DELIVERY IN THE
LONG 1970S
During their 12-day tour, the delegation was taken to 12 medical and
health facilities and also had 30 hours of scheduled discussions with
Chinese physicians. According to Dimond, while none of the delegates
had been to China before or knew any Chinese words, such lingua
medica as stethoscope, ophthalmoscope, electrocardiogram, and
laboratory data, nonetheless “bridged whatever other language gap
existed.” Deeply impressed by the PRC’s mass public health measures,
and China’s ability to provide inexpensive and convenient (if inexper-
ienced)AQ5 healthcare to its rural population of 700 million, Dimond
argued that Communism was only “a part, but not whole of the
exuberant drive of a people [in China],” contending that “China’s
achievement in public health shows that Communist China had more
to offer the world.”15
Dimond’s fellow delegate Victor Sidel felt strongly that China’s
Revolutionary experience in health and medicine could offer valuable
lessons for public health and community health work in the United
States, and indeed the rest of the world. Sidel’s own commitment to
community primary care had grown in reaction to the chilling effects of
McCarthyism and the Cold War. Like many of his generation on the
American Left, he believed strongly in the need for greater social and
economic justice in the United States and elsewhere in the world. As a
physician, Sidel channelled much of his political energy into public health
work, particularly community health undertakings, and he founded the
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oranization Physicians for Social Responsibility. In preparation for their
first China visit, Sidel and his wife Ruth, a social worker at a paediatric
health center at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, read a number of
works: Edgar Snow’s Red Star over China, William Hinton’s Fanshen, and
British surgeon Joshua Horn’s Away with All Pests. The latter depicted
healthcare in the PRC in a highly favorable light, and all three volumes
were decidedly propagandistic, eulogizing Communist China politically.
The Sidels apparently found these books, “detailing the extraordinary
changes in China during and after the revolution, were particularly
useful.”16
Sidel used his reading material to develop questions scrutinizing
healthcare delivery and community primary care in rural China. On
returning to the United States, the Sidels lectured and wrote extensively
on public health achievements in China, winning enthusiastic audiences.
Meanwhile, in New York’s Bronx district, a Community Health
Participation Program that recruited, trained, and supervised neighbor-
hood health workers, modelled on the Chinese Barefoot Doctor
program, was introduced. One year later, the CMA invited the Sidels
to return to China for a lengthier visit, to observe China’s public health
innovations in more detail and greater depth.
Another well-publicized admirer of China’s public health achieve-
ments was Joshua Horn, a British surgeon whose lectures attracted
large audiences in New York in 1971. When he first visited China in
1936 as a ship’s doctor, what he had witnessed appalled Horn. “China
was truly the sick man of Asia, rampant with poverty, disease and
corruption,” the result, he believed, of feudalism, imperialist oppres-
sion, and social evils such as concubinage. “China needed a revolution”
was the thought that filled the young Horn’s mind. When the PRC was
founded in 1949, Horn was won over by its claims to social justice. In
1954, Horn, by then an established surgeon in Great Britain, took the
first opportunity available to him to watch the new China of which he
had dreamed, moving there with his family and staying for 15 years.
What he found, or intended to find, in China’s new incarnation was
markedly different from the past. In his 1971 New York lecture, which
was subsequently broadcast in May 1972, Horn argued forcefully that
“the sick man of Asia” had been transformed into “the most healthy
man in the world,” with politics the driving force behind China’s
remarkable public health achievements. When delivering another
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lecture at the University of Hong Kong a year earlier, Horn had mar-
velled at China’s Barefoot Doctor program:
There are more than one million health workers [in China], and most of
them live in the countryside. This means one health worker for every six
hundred Chinese. For the first time in the five thousand years of Chinese
history, China has successfully achieved to deliver health services to its
people no matter where they live. China is the first one in the world to
achieve this. Yet in wealthy countries such as the United States millions of
people have no access to healthcare.17
This last sentence resonated with many US health professionals and public
health advocates, growing numbers of whom received opportunities to
visit mainland China. Like the first delegation, they were generally
impressed by new China’s public health achievements, in particular, how
China managed to resolve the problem of providing healthcare to its
700 million rural population, whereas the United States had failed to
meet its own population’s needs. Resident foreign medical specialists,
such as Shafick George Hatem, a Lebanese-born American physician living
in China, enthusiastically advertised Communist China’s accomplishments
to visiting Western health delegations. Hatem, originally from New York
City, had first ventured into eastern China in 1933, as a medical student.
He stayed on to practice medicine in China while seeing the sights, and
soon became attracted to the teachings of Communism. In 1936 Madame
Sun Yatsen introduced Hatem to Edgar Snow. Hatem accompanied the
latter on his visit to the Chinese Communists’ red base in Yan’an, where
he joined the Chinese Communist Party and became involved in CCP
health planning. After the Communists won control of China in 1949,
Hatem became the first foreigner to acquire Chinese nationality from the
PRC. Thereafter he assumed an active role in China’s public health work,
in particular the prevention and treatment of venereal diseases and
leprosy.18 In addition to his public health and medical work, Hatem was
known as “a brilliant apologist for the Chinese Communists.”19 Echoing
Horn, Hatem argued that a country so vast as China, with its feudal past
and uneducated masses, needed a centralized power to ensure its people
were provided with medical care, food, and other essentials for survival.
In the West, on the other hand, by the late 1960s the scientific and
technological revolution in medicine which had begun at the end of World
War II had apparently peaked. Major changes in medical care and access
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materialized more slowly, however. A growing consensus existed that in the
Western world medicine was in a state of crisis. Despite the huge efforts and
funds that had been invested in healthcare and medicine, in reality the
general health of the population was deteriorating. “New ideas are needed,
new systems of healthcare have to be explored.”20 Accounts by Horn,
Hatem, and other Western health observers, especially the popular works
of the Sidels, echoed in the 1972 documentary film The Barefoot Doctors of
Rural China by a group of scholars from Stanford University, all claimed
that China’s healthcare delivery system offered a radical new model.
This “Chinese approach” to healthcare delivery, understood as a draconian
government program intended to provide prompt, convenient, and inexpen-
sive healthcare to the 700 million people living in the rural countryside,
became increasingly attractive to Western health professionals and policy-
makers seeking a solution to the perceived Western health crisis. After spend-
ing several months in China as a CMA guest in 1973, one year later Phillip
Lee, a professor of social medicine at the University of California’s School of
Medicine at San Francisco, who had attended the 1965 White House
Conference, described China’s healthcare delivery system in glowing terms:
“Major epidemic diseases have been controlled, and in some cases apparently
eradicated. Nutritional status has been improved.Massive campaigns of health
education and environmental sanitation have been carried out. Large numbers
of health workers have been trained, and a system has been developed that
provides some health service for the great majority of the people.”21
Both the postwar scientific and technological revolutions and the collapse of
the remaining British, French, and Dutch colonial empires simultaneously
brought major changes around the world that presaged what is now termed
globalization. This brought greater awareness of growing global disparities,
especially in healthcare and access. Beyond the field of public health, medical
missionaries working in developing countries were equally strong voices alert-
ing theworld to the absence of basic healthcare in these nations. The very term
“Primary Health Care” first appeared in Contact, the journal of the Christian
Medical Commission, an organization that advocated Primary Health Care,
created in the late 1960s by medical missionaries under the broad umbrella of
the World Council of Churches and the Lutheran World Federation.22
In 1967, John Bryant, one of the foremost international public health
leaders of the previous three decades, and at that time a Rockefeller
Foundation staff member in Bangkok, published Health and the
Developing World, the outcome of a Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored
collaborative project. In this publication Bryant, a member of the
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Christian Medical Commission, argued that “large numbers of the world’s
people, perhaps more than half, have no access to health care at all, and for
many of the rest, the care they receive does not answer the problems they
have . . . the most serious health needs cannot be met by teams with spray
guns and vaccinating syringes.”23 Bryant’s views reflected new develop-
ments in international public health during the early 1970s. By this time
the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Division had more or less
retired from the global scene, and public health had embarked on a new
post-imperial stage, now labelled the “Fourth Phase” of public health.
China’s reputed ability to redress healthcare disparity, especially the
manner in which the Chinese had successfully reduced the health burden
on the state by incorporating existing medical practices into the national
health service, impressed governments in postcolonial Africa, Southeast
Asia, and Latin America, where healing and indigenous medicines played
an integral part in the political struggle for a new postcolonial identity.24
In 1967, for example, a medical delegation visiting China from Tanzania
was “impressed by the stage of development of health services, which have
been revolutionized and transformed by the new China.”25 These
Tanzanian officials viewed both the training of barefoot doctors and the
integration of indigenous methods and modern medicine as useful blue-
prints on which to develop a new national healthcare delivery system that
would cater to Tanzania’s rural population.26 Driven in part, too, by their
commitment to non-aligned socialism, assorted African states as well as
socialist countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America approached China
for health collaboration, including training and medical aid.
CHINA’S HEALTH AID TO AFRICA
China quickly realized that health projects were “inexpensive but profit-
able” undertakings that could boost its effort to promote a new interna-
tional order: a “people’s revolutionary movement” against “colonialism,
imperialism and hegemonism.”27 On June 5, 1971, in a conversation with
the government delegation from Somalia, Premier Zhou Enlai carefully
emphasized that health collaborations between the two countries were
intended to serve local interests and thereby promote friendship. Chinese
medical teams must renounce “superpower chauvinism.”28
Between 1963 and 1989, China sent medical teams to more than 40
countries in Africa. Different provinces in China were each twinned with
an African nation. Sichuan, for instance, was responsible for developing
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health projects in Mozambique, whereas medical teams from Shandong
went to Tanzania, those from Jilin to Somalia, and so on.29 In addition,
China gave medical and health training to a large number of students from
Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America, competing with the extensive
parallel programs training physicians in the Soviet Union, such as that at
Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow. China also sent regular
“friendship delegations” to these countries, groups that always included
at least one health worker, such as a model barefoot doctor. With this
expansion, China’s influence on healthcare delivery in Asia, Latin America,
and Africa grew exponentially. As Stacey Langwick has demonstrated, in
postcolonial settings such as Tanzania, China’s “friendship,” centered
around health collaborations, also paved the way for the re-emergence of
traditional medicine and a fast growing herbal market.30 In the mid-
1970s, Alan Hutchison observed that China’s Barefoot Doctor program
was particularly well suited to local rural conditions in many African
countries.31 The Soviet model was, by contrast, less effective.
Yet Chinese archival sources from this period reveal that politics were
always integral to Chinese medical activities and China’s crafting of Sino-
African friendship. Chinese medical teams were well aware that, in addi-
tion to their medical work, their mission was to spread Mao Zedong
Thought (毛泽东思想 or Maoism). While researching the African variety
of schistosomiasis in Somalia, for example, the Chinese team organized an
exhibition demonstrating how, with Mao’s leadership, China had success-
fully eradicated this deadly disease. Invitees to the exhibition included
workers, rural residents, officials, middle school students, and policemen.
Not only was medical and public health propaganda displayed, but the
villagers even learnt to sing The East is Red. This bore fruit. After seeing
the exhibition, one local official went over to the Chinese team and said:
“Thank you. Compared to the American, the British and the Italian
doctors, the Chinese are our most loyal friends.” Another government
technician was convinced that only Mao Zedong Thought was guaranteed
to bring happiness to the people of the world. During the 1971 Somalian
New Year celebrations, a group of workers and rural villagers sang The East
is Red while holding Mao’s portrait aloft. After singing and dancing, they
also shouted: “We thank Chinese doctors for helping us”; “Chinese bring
us food and cure us from diseases”; and “China brings us life. Don’t
invade China.”32
At the United Nations, China’s medical activities and the bonds of
friendship they forged contributed to China’s success in its battle against
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Taiwan.33 As early as 1971, China was seen as a crucial player on so-called
“African issues.” “China could out do the Soviet Union rhetorically and
also sponsor action that is too rich for Moscow’s blood,” argued
Hottelet.34 One reason why other states thought it necessary for the
PRC to hold the “China” seat in the UN General Assembly and the
Security Council was to prevent China furnishing military assistance and
leadership to national liberation movements in volatile regions of Africa.
Taiwan, by comparison, was considered too marginal to be a player in such
matters.35
“HEALTH FOR ALL”
After entering the United Nations, in 1973 China was invited to rejoin the
World Health Assembly.36 China’s rural health delivery system—the
Barefoot Doctors program—which involved a massive training program
and the major mobilization and organization of health services, linked to
mass political campaigns, soon became the foremost inspiration for the
burgeoning worldwide Primary Health Care movement. The emergence
of decolonized African nations and the spread of nationalist and anti-
imperialist socialist movements in less developed countries with more
limited economic resources demanded a new healthcare delivery model.
Coupled too with the perceived failure of single disease eradication pro-
grams, also known as the vertical health approach, as promoted by the
World Health Organization (WHO) and some US agencies in the 1950s
and 1960s, all provided further incentives to move from elite-based
healthcare and expert based medicine to primary healthcare and preventive
medicine.
1973 was also the year when Halfdan Mahler, who had previously
served as a WHO senior officer attached to the National Tuberculosis
Program in India, was elected Director-General of the WHO. His experi-
ences in India had made Mahler deeply concerned with issues of social
justice. As soon as Mahler took office, he appointed Kenneth Newell the
director of the new Division of Strengthening of Health Services. “Both
men were visionaries who shared common values that included dedication
to the pursuit of human development and justice,” recalled Socrates
Litsios, a former senior scientist in the WHO Control of Tropical
Diseases Division.37 Newell was a strong voice for broadening efforts in
primary healthcare. He had become interested in China’s Barefoot Doctor
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program and comparable developments in Cuba, Tanzania, and India, and
was keen to introduce similar programs in other developing countries.
Like Newell, Mahler responded enthusiastically to the widely cited
example of China’s successful experience in tackling health problems
with limited financial, technological, and human resources, and
believed it should be promoted around the world. In 1974, the WHO
invited Wang Guizhen, a model barefoot doctor from a village near
Shanghai, to address the Twenty-Seventh World Health Assembly on
China’s Barefoot Doctor program. In 1976, two barefoot doctors were
again invited to speak in Manila at the WHO Regional Office for the
Western Pacific’s First Regional Working Group meeting on Basic
Health Services.
Under Newell’s leadership, in 1975 WHO and UNICEF mounted a
joint project on “Alternative Approaches to Meeting Basic Health Needs
in Developing Countries.” Newell invited the Sidels to WHO headquar-
ters in Geneva, to serve as consultants on this project.38 This led to the
landmark publication Health by the People, which included a chapter on
China’s healthcare delivery system contributed by the Sidels. In his
Introduction to this volume, Newell criticized a strict health sectoral
approach as ineffective. According to him, some 80 percent of the world’s
rural population had no access to the health technology that many per-
ceived as “the shining example of present-day man’s technological inge-
nuity and progress.” Citing the examples of China’s Barefoot Doctor
program and the use of indigenous (subaltern) medicines, and also various
Christian Medical Commission programs, he argued for a new system of
Primary Health Care that was “either linked with the indigenous system or
attempted to play a role having some of the same social qualities that the
existing systems had.”39
This outlook pervaded the joint WHO/UNICEF project report,
Alternative Approaches to Meeting Basic Health Needs in Developing
Countries. The report examined successful Primary Health Care experi-
ences in Bangladesh, China, Cuba, India, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania,
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia, seeking to identify the crucial factors in their
success. China and Cuba emerged at the top of the list of successful
programs. Toward the end, under “Recommendations,” the report pro-
posed to adopt seven “principles in the orientation of and development of
health services” to achieve extensive Primary Health Care, guidelines that
closely resembled the Chinese Barefoot Doctor program, as outlined by
the Sidels.40
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Building on this report, in 1975 Mahler proposed “Health for All,”
which the Twenty-Ninth World Health Assembly formally adopted in
1976 as a goal to be achieved by the year 2000. Speaking to the
Assembly, Mahler affirmed the need for radical change: “Many social
evolutions and revolutions have taken place because the social structures
were crumbling. There are signs that the scientific and technical structures
of public health are also crumbling.”41 “Health for All by 2000” became
the rallying cry for the worldwide Primary Health Care movement.
According to the then technical assistant director general of WHO,
David A. Tejada de Rivero, a Peruvian physician, by “Health for All,”
Mahler “made it clear that he was referring to the need to provide a level
of health that would enable all people without exception to live socially
and economically productive lives.” Moreover, “the reference to the year
2000 meant that, as of that date, all the world’s countries would have
developed the appropriate political strategies and be carrying out concrete
measures toward achieving this social goal, albeit within different time
frames.”42
LEADING UP TO ALMA ATA
While major Western powers accepted the Mahlerian notion of Primary
Health Care, the Soviet Union, still greatly preferring the Soviet centra-
lized healthcare system, opposed and condemned it as a backward step
from the great scientific and technological advances achieved since the
beginning of the Cold War. Furthermore, the notion of Primary Health
Care was seen as a victory for the developing or Third World that would in
turn undermine the Soviet Union’s status as the world leader in healthcare
delivery and health provision. Even more important was the degree of
open Chinese–Soviet antagonism. Since the goal of “Health for All” was
largely inspired by China’s Barefoot Doctor program, Moscow felt very
strongly that it could not permit Beijing to win “a victory within the Third
World.”43 The PRC, however, used the World Health Assembly meeting
to wage diplomatic battle against the Soviet Union. At the Twenty-
Seventh World Health Assembly meeting, Wang Guizhen, China’s
model barefoot doctor and spokesperson, was briefed to use the meeting
to propagate not just Mao’s health policy but also Mao’s international
political line, so as to defeat China’s enemies. On returning, Wang proudly
reported that the meeting had been a great triumph for China and
Chairman Mao, since many Third World countries and WHO officials
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had praised China’s cooperative health system and the Barefoot Doctor
program, while condemning Soviet medical training and aid to the Third
World as inappropriate for those countries.44
After the Chinese WHO delegation first proposed the idea of an inter-
national conference on Primary Health Care, the Soviet Union began
intensive lobbying to host the conference in the Soviet Union.45 In
January 1976, one day before the WHO Executive Board meeting, the
Soviet Minister of Health Dimitri Venediktov appeared at Tejada de
Rivero’s home in Geneva and proposed: “I will give you US$2 million
for an international conference on Primary Health Care.” Despite Tejada
de Rivero’s reluctance to accept this offer, Venediktov repeated this pro-
posal at the Executive Board meeting. Only after Venediktov agreed that
the conference would not be held in Moscow but instead in a developing
country would the Executive Board accept his offer, with the conference
scheduled for 1978.46
The search for a suitable Third World location was difficult. Since
the Soviet Union was sponsoring the conference, this excluded China,
the world’s leader in, and a major inspiration for, the Primary Health
Care movement. Other countries the WHO favored included Costa
Rica, Egypt, and Iran, but none could successfully secure the addi-
tional US$1 million the conference required. After traveling exten-
sively around the Soviet Union, Venediktov and Tejada de Rivero
agreed on Alma Ata (present-day Almaty), the capital of the Kazakh
Soviet Socialist Republic (present-day Kazakhstan) as a suitable loca-
tion for the conference. According to Tejada de Rivero, two factors
drove the choice of Alma Ata: it possessed a most impressive confer-
ence hall and also an extremely dynamic Minister of Health, Professor
Turgeldy S. Sharmanov.47 For the Soviets, however, Alma Ata was
also significant because it was geographically proximate to China.
Furthermore, it was a showcase of Soviet socialist achievements in
providing healthcare for the backward Kazakhs through a centralized
state-run health delivery system bringing modern biomedicine to rural
villagers.
Lying south of Siberia and east of the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan bore no
geographic or cultural resemblance to the rest of the Soviet Union. Most
of its population were Turkic-speaking Muslims. From the late nineteenth
century, Russians and Ukrainians from European Russia began to settle in
the northern part of Kazakhstan and introduced agriculture to the pre-
viously nomadic Kazakhs. In 1925, the region was made an Autonomous
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Soviet Socialist Republic. From 1928 onward the Soviet government,
seeking to build a strong and self-sufficient nation, embarked on a mod-
ernization program—also known as the Stalinist Revolution—encompass-
ing rapid industrialization and agricultural collectivization across the
region. This led to a devastating famine that killed half the population
between 1932 and 1933.48
To improve the local human stock of manpower and thereby facilitate
its program of bringing modernity and socialist rationality into the hinter-
land, in 1928, numerous Soviet health professionals were sent to
Kazakhstan to provide the indigenous population with advanced biome-
dical services. Aiming to transform them into the new Soviet man and
woman, who “would have faith in the Soviet State’s and the Communist
Party’s ability to lead the citizenry towards a higher stage of economic and
cultural development,” medical cadres taught Kazakh villagers that dis-
eases were caused by germs, not evil spirits, and that they should have faith
in the power of science, not superstitions.49 The new Soviet order had no
place for superstitions, irrationality, and a backward and therefore unscien-
tific past. In 1931 the V. M. Molotov Kazakh Medical Institute or Kazakh
National Medical University was founded in Alma Ata. Turgeldy S.
Sharmanov was one of its proud graduates. Between 1927 and 1937 the
number of modern doctors in the region tripled. In 1942, to celebrate the
25th anniversary of the October Revolution, the Kazakh Commissar of
Public Health proudly declared that Kazakhstan’s backward culture had
disappeared forever. Between 1950 and 1970, following Soviet healthcare
norms that emphasized large numbers of hospital beds and doctors, many
hospitals and polyclinics were built in Kazakhstan.50 By the time the Alma
Ata conference took place, the Sovietification of Kazakhstan had been
completed. Soviet authorities claimed that life expectancy had increased,
diseases and epidemics had subsided, and the general health of
Kazakhstan’s people had greatly improved. In 1981, Kazakh National
Medical University received the Order of the Red Banner of Labor for
“great services and people’s public health development.”
Back at WHO headquarters in Geneva, Newell was made responsible
for drawing up documents for the Alma Ata conference. Extensive con-
flicts occurred over the wording of the text of the Declaration. “Not only
the Soviet Union but many Member States supported a centralized health-
systems approach. Primary Health Care will not succeed unless we can
generate participation from individuals, families and communities, but this
community participation will not work unless there is support from the
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health system,” Mahler recalled in a 2008 interview.51 According to
Tejada de Rivero: “Many delegations and individual delegates fought to
include details that had more to do with medical specialties than with
health. . . .The Declaration and Recommendations went through 18 drafts
revised in meetings in the six WHO regions, in the Special Meeting of
Ministers of Health of the Americas in 1977 and in meetings of special
country groupings and certain individual countries as well.”52 “It wasn’t
easy,” Mahler remembered. “But there was an overwhelming feeling that
‘we must arrive at a consensus.’ . . .That did not mean trying to convince
our adversaries they were wrong, but trying to unite ourselves with them
at a higher level of insight. This was exactly what happened in Alma-Ata. It
was almost a spiritual atmosphere, not in the religious sense, but in the
sense that people wanted to accomplish something great.”53
In September 1978, 3,000 delegates from 134 member states, 67
international organizations, and a dozen NGOs from around the globe
attended the world’s first Primary Health Care conference at Alma Ata.
China, the inspiration for the conference, was absent. “At the end of the
conference, a young African woman physician in beautiful African garb
read out the Declaration of Alma-Ata. Lots of people had tears in their
eyes. We never thought we would come that far. That was a sacred
moment,” Mahler fondly recalled. “The 1970s was a warm decade for
social justice. That’s why after Alma-Ata in 1978, everything seemed
possible.”54
THE END OF BAREFOOT DOCTORS IN POST-MAO CHINA
Although contemporary international politics meant that China was
excluded from the Alma Ata conference, around the same time China by
choice gradually began to abandon the Barefoot Doctor program. The
program was officially ended after 1983, as China opted for neoliberal
market capitalism, or the so-called system of “Socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” Born out of the specific political and economic context
of the Maoist period, the Barefoot Doctor program could only exist within
the collective socialist economic system, which was fundamentally flawed.
Once the farming collectives (the People’s Communes) were dissolved
after the death of Mao, and the household quota system (包产到户) was
introduced, the cooperative medical service (合作医疗), which provided
the framework for the Barefoot Doctors program, was no longer viable
and collapsed.
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Without the cooperative medical system and farming collectives, rural
health services had to be contracted out (承包). According to a 1980
Ministry of Health report, rural China had over 5,000 commune hospitals
with 777,000 hospital beds and more than 1 million health workers. They
had previously been paid by the communes from collective funds, and
subsidized by the government. Once the collective economic system
ceased, the communes had no money to cover their expenditure and
salaries, a huge number of beds were cut, and health workers lost their
livelihood.55 To support themselves, these health workers and barefoot
doctors opened private practices and charged high prices. It seemed highly
ironic that by the mid-1980s millions of rural villagers in China, once the
world leader in Primary Health Care, were left without healthcare.
Yet China was not alone in abandoning the Primary Health Care
approach. One year after the Alma Ata Declaration, Kenneth Warren,
who had been appointed Director of Health Science at the Rockefeller
Foundation in 1977, and his colleague Julia Walsh, proposed Selective
Primary Health Care as an “interim” strategy for disease control in devel-
oping countries.56 Several UN agencies quickly adopted this selective
approach, since it was less costly than the more integrated approaches
preferred by Mahler and Newell. Warren, sometimes described by those
who knew him well as “contemptuous,” was obsessed with health quality
and information.57 Under his leadership, the Great Neglected Disease
Network (GND) was established.58 This move greatly disappointed advo-
cates of Primary Health Care such as Mahler: “That brought us right back
to square one.” He lamented:
We had started with selective health-care programs, single diseases such as
malaria and tuberculosis in the 1950s and 1960s. Then we had this spiritual
and intellectual awakening that came out of Alma-Ata, and suddenly some
proponents of primary health care went back to the old selective approach
again. Perhaps, paradoxically, Alma-Ata had in such instances the opposite
effect to the one intended, as it made people think too much about selec-
tion, rather than following the Alma-Ata gospel of health for all.59
Interestingly, although in China a large section of today’s population
enjoys little or no access to adequate healthcare, in recent years the
Chinese government has continued to make the Barefoot Doctor program
a central component of its international health diplomacy, most notably
across Sub-Saharan Africa. A 2010 Chinese Xinhua News Agency report
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claimed that China’s Barefoot Doctor program could help African coun-
tries reduce their infant mortality rates. As President Xi Jinping’s “China
Dream” extends to Africa, the Chinese government is increasingly prior-
itizing health aid to this region. As in the Long 1970s, when health
cooperation with African nations was seen as a useful tool facilitating
Chinese efforts to promote a new international order, in the twenty-first
century China’s health aid to Africa helps the PRC enhance its profile in
the developing world as a major reformer and provider in the field of
healthcare, not merely as the market for raw materials from Africa.60
This led to the regular Ministerial Forum of China–Africa Health
Development, first inaugurated by Chinese President Xi Jinping in
September 2013. Noting the long and positive history of Chinese–
African cooperation on health, Li Bin, Minister of China’s Health and
Family Planning Commission, proclaimed at the Forum that “China will
continue to strengthen cooperation with international organizations on
global health and population development, and make use of international
platforms to explore new approaches to South-South cooperation in the
area of health with developing countries in Africa and elsewhere.”61
CONCLUSION
As the Cold War explicitly demonstrated, Medicine and Health AQ6invariably
possess political dimensions. Mainland China deftly deployed healthcare in
propaganda efforts in both the First and Third Worlds, initiatives that com-
plemented the sports diplomacy and aid programs described by XuGuoqi and
Shu Guang Zhang elsewhere in this volume. By the mid-1960s, the US
government viewed politically well-connectedAmericanmedical professionals
as potential intermediaries, whose purportedly neutral visits might signal US
interest in developing more connections with mainland China. China skilfully
utilized Western fascination with both its mass healthcare achievements and
traditional Chinese medical practices. Western critics of existing health dispa-
rities in industrialized nations and advocates of Social Medicine came to view
the PRC as a model for primary healthcare delivery. This complemented
increasingly positive images of the PRC and its totalitarian government pur-
veyed from the second half of the 1960s by its cohort ofWestern sympathizers
who associated Communist China with opposition to American aggression in
Vietnam aimed at suppressing a Leftist revolution. In developing countries
and the United Nations, the rise of the “Third Way,” championed by
Yugoslavia and India, offered China global space to effect its political goals
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through healthcare. During the Long 1970s, mainland China—standing in
opposition to the American system (with its perceived healthcare shortfalls)
and the Soviet centralized healthcare structure—seemed to hold out the
promise of a true alternative model, one that seemed on the verge of triumph
throughout this pivotal decade, and climaxed at the Alma Ata Conference.
Ultimately, as Chinese healthcare became an ever less exportable cultural
propaganda asset, this model collapsed, proving as ephemeral as the predo-
minance of theBarefootDoctors program,which disappearedwith the ending
of China’s agricultural communes, all alike swallowed up in the ravening late
twentieth-century morass of global neoliberal capitalism.
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